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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To examine the volume, relevance and
quality of transnational tobacco corporations’ (TTCs)
evidence that standardised packaging of tobacco
products ‘won’t work’, following the UK government’s
decision to ‘wait and see’ until further evidence is
available.
Design: Content analysis.
Setting: We analysed the evidence cited in
submissions by the UK’s four largest TTCs to the UK
Department of Health consultation on standardised
packaging in 2012.
Outcome measures: The volume, relevance (subject
matter) and quality (as measured by independence
from industry and peer-review) of evidence cited by
TTCs was compared with evidence from a systematic
review of standardised packaging . Fisher’s exact test
was used to assess differences in the quality of TTC
and systematic review evidence. 100% of the data were
second-coded to validate the findings: 94.7%
intercoder reliability; all differences were resolved.
Results: 77/143 pieces of TTC-cited evidence were
used to promote their claim that standardised
packaging ‘won’t work’. Of these, just 17/77 addressed
standardised packaging: 14 were industry connected
and none were published in peer-reviewed journals.
Comparison of TTC and systematic review evidence on
standardised packaging showed that the industry
evidence was of significantly lower quality in terms of
tobacco industry connections and peer-review
(p<0.0001). The most relevant TTC evidence (on
standardised packaging or packaging generally, n=26)
was of significantly lower quality (p<0.0001) than the
least relevant (on other topics, n=51). Across the
dataset, TTC-connected evidence was significantly less
likely to be published in a peer-reviewed journal
(p=0.0045).
Conclusions: With few exceptions, evidence cited by
TTCs to promote their claim that standardised
packaging ‘won’t work’ lacks either policy relevance or
key indicators of quality. Policymakers could use these
three criteria—subject matter, independence and peer-
review status—to critically assess evidence submitted
to them by corporate interests via Better Regulation
processes.
INTRODUCTION
Standardised packaging of tobacco products
entails the prohibition of logos, brand
imagery, symbols, other images, colours and
promotional text from tobacco products and
tobacco product packaging. Despite the
common use of the term ‘plain packaging’
in media coverage of this issue, graphic and
textual health warning labels would still
feature prominently on packs and key antic-
ounterfeiting marks would be retained.
Standardised packaging would further
restrict the already limited opportunities of
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) to
market their products. The policy’s objective
is to deter smoking initiation, particularly
among young people, and promote cessation
among existing smokers. Its introduction in
Australia in December 20121 sparked a wave
of interest: Ireland and New Zealand gave
strong indications of their intentions to intro-
duce standardised packaging. In contrast, the
Strengths and limitations of the study
▪ This study builds on the existing literature on
corporate influence over public health policy to
demonstrate the challenges policymakers face in
assessing evidence submitted via public
consultations.
▪ Further investigation of policymakers’ perceptions
of corporate evidence would be beneficial to cor-
roborate the pertinence of our recommendations.
▪ Indicators were used to assess quality as these
would be suited to the practical demands of the
policymaking context.
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UK government announced on 12 July 2013 that it had
decided to wait for ‘emerging evidence’ from Australia
on the impacts of standardised packaging before taking
a policy decision. This announcement followed a
lengthy debate which began in 2011,2 included a
4-month public consultation ending in August 2012,3
and was subject to nearly a year’s deliberation within the
Department of Health before the consultation report
was published.4 The consultation aimed to inform policy
development and gather additional evidence for an
impact assessment. The impact assessment was rated
amber (needing more work) by the Regulatory Policy
Committee (RPC) in February 2012.5
Public consultations and impact assessments are pro-
cesses within a global governance innovation termed Better
Regulation (also known as Smart regulation or better law-
making). Drawing heavily on American Administrative Law
and the cost-beneﬁt approach to regulatory review in the
USA,6 7 versions of Better Regulation are in place, for
example, in multiple European Union (EU) states (UK,
the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Sweden and Germany),8
in the EU itself9 and in Canada10 and Australia.11 A key
impetus for Better Regulation has been the pressure put
on governments and inter-governmental organisations by
TTCs and other transnational corporations to reduce regu-
latory business costs and prioritise business interests in the
policy process.8 12
Public consultations effectively frontload problem-
resolution in the policy process by offering affected busi-
nesses and other interested parties an early opportunity to
comment on policy ideas and proposals, and to submit evi-
dence supporting their views.13 14 Examples of consult-
ation systems elsewhere include ‘notice and comment’ in
the USA15 and the European Commission’s ‘Your voice in
Europe’.16 Evidence gathered from consultations can then
be taken into account in developing impact assessments,
which entail quantitative evidence-based assessments of
the potential effects of proposed regulations and consider-
ation of alternative policy options.17 Evidence plays a key
role in the policy process, and, in practice, Better
Regulation underpins a form of evidence-based policy-
making which is deliberately open to stakeholder, and par-
ticularly business, inﬂuence.18 19
In the UK, these processes contribute to the attainment
of ﬁve features of good governance: proportionality,
accountability, consistency, transparency and targeting.14 20
Under New Labour18 and the Coalition Government,8
Better Regulation has formalised evidence-based policy-
making, which is now subject to two stages of scrutiny: ﬁrst,
by the RPC (a body sponsored by the Department of
Business Innovation and Skills); and, subsequently, by the
Cabinet’s Reducing Regulation Committee (RRC). The
upfront costs to the government of this process are
intended to be offset by an associated reduced impact on
businesses post-implementation.
New tobacco control policies developed by the
Department of Health are subject to Better Regulation.
Thus, TTCs can make submissions to public
consultations on tobacco control policies, citing evi-
dence regarding impacts on their businesses, wider
impacts and in support of alternative policies. Yet, the
government is also required to meet an international
commitment made under Article 5.3 of the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) to take steps to
ensure that: “…in setting and implementing their public
health policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties
shall act to protect these policies from commercial and
other vested interests of the tobacco industry in accord-
ance with national law.”21 A key rationale for this provi-
sion lies in the overwhelming evidence of the tobacco
industry’s efforts to bias the evidence base of health
impacts of tobacco products and public health policies
in its favour.22–25 Uniquely in the case of tobacco, the
coexistence of these two governance regimes raises the
possibility of a regulatory conﬂict between commitments
to include businesses in policy development and com-
mitments to protect public health policies from them.26
The UK’s consultation3 and impact assessment5 on stan-
dardised packaging provides an opportunity to consider
how these two sets of commitments are reconciled by gov-
ernments. The four largest TTCs in the UK market—
Imperial Tobacco (IT), Japan Tobacco International ( JTI),
Philip Morris Ltd (PM) and British American Tobacco
(BAT)—submitted lengthy consultation responses (1521
pages in total, of which 328 comprised their main
responses and 1193 provided supplementary materials).27–
30 These were just 4 of 668 433 responses the Department
of Health received (2444 were ‘detailed responses’).4
Associated time and resource costs raise the question of
how governments can effectively make a balanced,
informed and transparent assessment of the policy rele-
vance and the quality of all evidence cited in submissions.31
A systematic review of the evidence for standardised
packaging, commissioned by the Department of Health,
concluded that there is ‘strong evidence’ that standardised
packaging would reduce the appeal of tobacco products
and increase the prominence of health warnings.32
However, in their submissions, TTCs rejected the ﬁndings
of the systematic review on the grounds that there is no evi-
dence that standardised packaging would reduce smoking
prevalence or initiation.27–30 They cited extensive evidence
to support their arguments, claimed that key evidence on
smoking behaviour had not been considered in the system-
atic review, and pointed to the absence of real-world evi-
dence as problematic: the UK consultation preceded
implementation of standardised packaging in Australia in
December 2012. The TTCs have maintained that advertis-
ing and promotional material—including packaging—
stimulate only brand switching among current
smokers.27 29 30 33 Yet, overwhelming evidence from the
tobacco industry’s own marketing documents suggests this
claim is highly disingenuous.34–37
In this article, we aim to examine the volume, policy
relevance and quality of the evidence TTCs cited in
their submissions and compare it with that included in
the systematic review (further work is underway to
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investigate TTCs’ interpretation of the evidence itself).
We use this analysis to explore the challenges public
consultations and impact assessments for tobacco
control policies present to governments and begin to
unpack the conﬂict between the Better Regulation
agenda and the FCTC. We suggest evidential manage-
ment strategies for governments developing tobacco
control policies in this multilevel governance context.
METHODS
Defining ‘evidence’
The comparative analysis methodology employed in this
research required that ‘evidence’ was interpreted narrowly
as formal written research sources, such as reports or
journal articles. This restriction enabled a comparison of
similar evidence in the two datasets: TTC citations and sys-
tematic review evidence. Other forms of evidence (eg,
opinion, political statements, legal rulings and press cover-
age) cited in the four TTCs’ submissions were excluded.
Selecting and recording TTC evidence
Details (author, title, date and source) of each piece of
evidence cited by TTCs in their submissions were
extracted into an Excel spreadsheet and categorised
under three main arguments made by TTCs: there is no
evidence of the beneﬁcial impact of standardised pack-
aging on public health—standardised packaging ‘won’t
work’; standardised packaging will have negative unin-
tended consequences (including economic impacts on
businesses, growth in illicit trade in tobacco products,
reduction in the price of cigarettes or contravention of
existing trade and intellectual property rules); and the
policy process was ‘ﬂawed’. Evidence was also cate-
gorised as to whether it was promoted by TTCs as sup-
porting their argument, or contested by them. Only
evidence used by TTCs to promote their argument that
standardised packaging ‘won’t work’ was obtained and
examined further.
Evidence from the systematic review
Details of the studies cited in the systematic review were
recorded in Excel and were used for further analysis of
their relevance and quality.
Criteria for assessing evidence
Three criteria, identiﬁed via a review of similar studies
of the quality of evidence used to oppose tobacco regu-
lation,24 38–42 were used to assess the policy relevance
and quality of the evidence: subject matter, independ-
ence and peer-review (table 1). These criteria represent
an objective and practical means for policymakers to
assess the policy relevance and quality of large quantities
of evidence cited in submissions to public consultations
prior to considering their content.
The subject matter of the evidence speaks to its relevance
to the policy issue.31 Similar work has coded policy pos-
ition, argument, topic and conclusion.40–42 On
independence, research indicates that connection of
research with a ﬁnancially vested interest group can
produce results which favour the sponsor, casting doubt
on the independence, and therefore quality, of the evi-
dence.40 43 44 The tobacco industry’s efforts to discredit
the science on environmental tobacco smoke and bias evi-
dence on the impacts of smoke-free legislation provide his-
torical examples of this.22–25 45 On peer-review status, articles
which appear in peer-reviewed journals have been shown
to be of superior quality to other research outputs in
terms of study design, reporting and interpretation.40 46
For example, peer-review enables studies to be assessed by
experts who are knowledgeable in the subject area, pro-
vides strong incentives for authors to heed advice and
improve articles and acts as a ﬁlter which aims to prevent
poorly designed studies from being published. Some alter-
native publication routes also include external peer-review
(eg, government-commissioned research, academic press
volumes and conference papers); others rely on internal
peer-review (eg, charity and university research reports);
research funded and published by the tobacco industry
tends not to be subject to an external peer-review process:
“[T]he tobacco industry has had a long-standing strategy
of funding research and disseminating it through their
sponsored, non-peer-reviewed publications.”47 48
Evidential coding
Each piece of evidence was obtained via online searches
(general search engines and the research database
Scopus), with non-digital documents obtained from
library sources. Researchers read abstracts, introductions,
conclusions, funding statements and cover pages of all
evidence documents, and searched documents for key
terms (‘plain’, ‘pack*’, ‘standard*’, ‘tobacco’, ‘smok*’).
Additional web searches were conducted (eg, the Legacy
Library of tobacco industry documents and Scopus) to
clarify the independence and peer-review status of
evidence.
Analytical process
The researchers used a content analysis methodology to
code and analyse the data. Each piece of evidence was
accessed and coded by one researcher ( JLH) using the
criteria outlined in table 1. A second researcher (GJF)
blind-coded a random sample of 20% of the data (n=21).
This process achieved a 97% level of inter-coder reliabil-
ity. Once all the data had been analysed, a third
researcher (KAE-R) blind-coded 100% of the data. This
process achieved a 94.7% level of inter-coder reliability.
All disagreements were fully resolved between the coders.
Having quantiﬁed and coded the evidence, we com-
pared the policy relevance (subject matter) and quality
(independence and peer-review) of the industry evi-
dence with that of the evidence supporting standardised
packaging in the systematic review.32 We also examined
the relationship between policy relevance and quality by
comparing the quality of the industry’s evidence on
tobacco packaging with its evidence on other topics.
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Differences were compared using a two-tailed Fisher’s
exact test. The results were used to develop relevance-
quality typologies of the TTC evidence. Evidence was
classiﬁed as relevant if it focused on standardised pack-
aging/tobacco packaging, and parallel if it focused on
other tobacco issues/was unrelated to tobacco. Evidence
was classiﬁed as featuring quality indicators if it was either
independent, published in a peer-reviewed journal or
both.
RESULTS
Overview of evidence cited by the TTCs in their
submissions
One hundred and forty-three unique pieces of formal
written research evidence were referred to or included
in the four TTCs’ submissions (22 referenced by more
than one company; table 2). Of the 143 documents,
TTCs promoted 131 as supporting their arguments and
contested the methods, ﬁndings or accessibility of the
Table 1 Coding framework for classifying evidence
Evidential
criteria
Use in previous
studies
Data coding
framework Coding categories
Relevance Subject matter What is the topic,
argument, position or
conclusion of the
evidence?40–42
What issue does the
research address?
▸ Standardised packaging of tobacco
▸ Tobacco packaging, eg, graphic health
warnings
▸ Tobacco, not packaging
▸ Unrelated to tobacco
Quality Independence Who funded the
evidence? Are authors
affiliated to the tobacco
industry?39–42
Who funded the
research?
Has the author of the
research any
connection with the
tobacco industry?
▸ Tobacco industry-funded (statement
included that the research was funded
by the tobacco industry)
▸ Tobacco industry-linked (no statement
that the research was funded by the
tobacco industry, but evidence of other
connection: eg, author or funder have
prior links to the tobacco industry)
▸ Independent of the tobacco industry
(statement included that the research
was funded by a source independent of
the tobacco industry)
▸ No apparent tobacco industry
connection (no information provided
about funding source and no evidence
of prior connection with the tobacco
industry)
Peer-review
status
Has the evidence been
peer-reviewed?
What is the impact
factor of the journal and
date of publication?39–42
Was the research
published in
peer-reviewed journal?
If not, where was the
research published?
▸ Peer-reviewed journal
▸ Academic press volume
▸ Conference paper
▸ Government-commissioned research
▸ University research report
▸ Government internal research
▸ Charity research report
▸ Private company research report
▸ Unpublished
Table 2 Overview of formal written evidence cited by transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) in their submissions to the
UK standardised packaging consultation 2012
Theme of
evidence
Standardised packaging
‘won’t work’: no evidence
of impacts on smoking
behaviour
Standardised packaging ‘will have
negative unintended consequences’
The policy process
was ‘flawed’ Total
How cited
by TTCs Economic Illicit IP/Trade Price
Promoted 77* 3 18 5 9 19 131
Contested 11 1 0 0 0 0 12
– 4 18 5 9 – –
Total 88 36 19 143
*The evidence examined further in this article. Bold text indicates totals.
4 Hatchard JL, Fooks GJ, Evans-Reeves KA, et al. BMJ Open 2014;4:e003757. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2013-003757
Open Access
 group.bmj.com on July 25, 2014 - Published by bmjopen.bmj.comDownloaded from 
remaining 12, all of which were included in the system-
atic review. Eighty-eight pieces of evidence were cited to
support arguments that standardised packaging would
not have beneﬁcial impacts on public health; 36 were
cited to argue that standardised packaging will have
negative unintended consequences, half of which
related to the illicit trade in tobacco; 19 were cited to
argue that the policy process—particularly the impact
assessment—was ‘ﬂawed’. Seventy-seven pieces of evi-
dence were used to promote the TTCs’ argument that
standardised packaging ‘won’t work’ and were therefore
the subject of further analysis in this article.
Among these 77 documents, TTCs did not cite any
research showing that the tobacco industry has exten-
sively studied and holds considerable evidence attesting
to the impact of packaging on smoking behaviour.34–37
Instead, they cited industry-funded research which cri-
tiqued the systematic review articles, the impact assess-
ment and the consultation document. And they cited a
body of independent research into the drivers of youth
smoking which, while published in peer-reviewed health
and psychology journals with no apparent connection to
the tobacco industry, did not explicitly address the role
of packaging in youth uptake or prevalence.
Comparison of the TTC and systematic review evidence on
the impact of standardised packaging on smoking
behaviour
There are marked differences between the relevance
and quality of the TTC and systematic review evidence
(table 3 and ﬁgure 1). Only 17/77 (22%) pieces of
evidence promoted by TTCs addressed standardised
packaging directly; the majority of these were industry-
funded/linked (14/17, 82%) and none were published
in a peer-reviewed journal (0/17, 0%). The remaining
60 pieces of evidence (78% of the total, comprising the
majority of the evidence the industry cites) did not
address standardised packaging. In contrast, 37/37
(100%) pieces of evidence included in the systematic
Figure 1 Comparison of quality (independence and
publication route) of the systematic review and transnational
tobacco corporation evidence directly addressing
standardised packaging of tobacco products.
Table 3 Quality and relevance of transnational tobacco corporation (TTC) and systematic review evidence
Relevance: subject matter
Standardised packaging Other (TTC evidence only)
Quality
Systematic review
evidence (n=37)
TTC
evidence
(n=17)
Tobacco
packaging
(n=9)
Tobacco, not
packaging
(n=45)
Unrelated to
tobacco (n=6)
Independence
Industry-funded 0 12 2 1 0
Industry-linked 0 2 1 2 1
Independent 31 3 6 37 5
No apparent connection to the
tobacco industry
6 0 0 5 0
Publication route
Peer-reviewed journal 21 0 1 26 4
Academic press 0 0 0 1 1
Conference paper 2 1 0 0 0
Government-commission 8 0 2 2 0
University research 5 0 1 2 0
Government internal research 0 2 1 12 0
Charity research 1 1 1 0 1
Private company research 0 13 3 1 0
Unpublished 0 0 0 1 0
Bold text highlights evidence relating to standardised packaging.
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review focused on standardised packaging, none (0/37,
0%) had a connection with the tobacco industry, and
21/37 (57%) pieces of evidence were published in a
peer-reviewed journal. A comparison of TTCs’ evidence
on standardised packaging (n=17) with the systematic
review evidence on standardised packaging (n=37),
using Fisher’s exact test, showed that the former was of
signiﬁcantly lower quality in terms of independence
(p<0.0001) and peer-review status (p<0.0001).
Relationships between subject matter, independence and
peer-review within the TTC evidence
A low proportion of TTCs’ evidence relating to standar-
dised packaging was independent or peer-reviewed
(ﬁgure 1 and table 3). When evidence on tobacco pack-
aging was added to the standardised packaging evidence,
the same pattern was found: 9/26 (35%) Pieces of evi-
dence were independent (independent/no apparent
tobacco industry connection); 1/26 (4%) pieces of evi-
dence was published in a peer-reviewed journal (table 4)
However, a greater proportion of the 51 pieces of evidence
TTCs cited on parallel topics (including non-packaging
drivers of youth and adult smoking behaviour, and drivers
of youth behaviour in general) were independent (47/51,
92% independent/no apparent connection) and peer-
reviewed (30/51, 59% published in a peer-reviewed
journal). These differences are statistically signiﬁcant
(p<0.0001, table 4). We also found a clear relationship
between the two indicators of quality—independence and
peer-review—in the TTCs’ evidence: industry-funded/
linked studies cited by TTCs were signiﬁcantly less likely to
be published in a peer-reviewed journal (3/21, 14%) than
independent/no apparent connection studies they cited
(28/56, 50%; p=0.0045, table 5).
TTCs’ evidence was classiﬁed into four typologies
(table 6): relevant/quality indicators, relevant/no quality
indicators, parallel/quality indicators and parallel/no
quality indicators. While 100% of the systematic review
evidence was relevant and featured at least one of the two
quality indicators, only 12% of evidence cited by TTCs in
their submissions qualiﬁed for this category.
DISCUSSION
Four main ﬁndings are apparent. TTCs cited a large
volume of evidence in their submissions to the UK stan-
dardised packaging consultation. Seventy-seven pieces of
evidence were used to support the claim that standar-
dised packaging ‘won’t work’ yet just 17 of these actually
focused on standardised packaging, 14 of which had a
connection with the industry. The quality of the TTCs’
evidence on standardised packaging is signiﬁcantly
lower, as judged by independence and peer-review, than
that included in the systematic review. Overall, the evi-
dence cited by TTCs is shown, with few exceptions, to ﬁt
one of two typologies—either relevant/no quality indica-
tors or parallel/quality indicators (table 6). Furthermore,
we show that evidence funded by or otherwise linked to
industry is signiﬁcantly less likely to be peer-reviewed
than non-industry-connected evidence.
These ﬁndings raise a number of concerns regarding
the potential impact of Better Regulation on tobacco
control policymaking in jurisdictions around the world.
First, our ﬁndings highlight how Better Regulation, with
its requirement for public consultations and impact
assessments, imposes costs on government departments
in the earliest stage of policy development. Just as TTCs
habitually launch legal challenges in the postdecision
phase of policy-making,49 so too can they use their
resource advantage to exploit Better Regulation pro-
cesses by commissioning new research and submitting
extensive and complex responses in the predecision
phase of the policy process, effectively frontloading their
opposition. The combination of a requirement for due
diligence and the volume and nature of responses may
Table 4 Relationship between the policy relevance and two indicators of quality in the transnational tobacco corporations’
evidence (n=77), number and per cent in parenthesis
Quality indicators
Policy relevance: subject matter
Relevant: standardised packaging/
tobacco packaging (n=26)
Parallel: tobacco not packaging/
unrelated to tobacco (n=51)
Fisher’s
p value
Independent of/no apparent
tobacco industry connection
9/26 (35%) 47/51 (92%) <0.0001
Published in a peer-reviewed
journal
1/26 (4%) 30/51 (59%) <0.0001
Table 5 Relationship between two indicators of quality in the transnational tobacco corporation evidence, number and per
cent in parenthesis
Peer-review status
Independent of/no apparent tobacco
industry connection (n=56)
Connected with the tobacco
industry (n=21)
Fisher’s
p value
Published in a
peer-reviewed journal
28/56 (50%) 3/21 (14%) p=0.0045
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have contributed to the 11-month delay in the publica-
tion of the Department of Health’s consultation report.
Second, Better Regulation’s requirement that policy-
makers consider alternative policy options, with its
underlying intention of preventing unnecessary regula-
tion, imposes additional upfront costs on governments.
In the case of standardised packaging, this requirement
encouraged the extensive citation of evidence beyond
the focus of the policy proposal. This may partly explain
why nearly two-thirds of the evidence TTCs cited to
claim that standardised packaging ‘won’t work’
addressed non-packaging drivers of youth and adult
smoking: studies which do not consider standardised
packaging in their methodology or analysis. A second
possible explanation is that the level of independence
and peer-review of this parallel evidence is signiﬁcantly
higher than that of the evidence they cite on tobacco
packaging, and its inclusion may therefore have been
intended to add legitimacy to the TTCs’ arguments.
Third, the absence of guidelines requiring a declar-
ation of any conﬂict of interest between corporations
and the evidence they cite enable tobacco industry-
funded/linked work to be cited by TTCs in such a way
that any link is undeclared, implying independence. For
example, BAT, IT and PM all cited tobacco industry-
funded/linked evidence in their submissions without
explicitly acknowledging their connection with it.27 29 30
This speaks to a lack of transparency in the policy
process regarding the provenance of evidence submitted
by corporate interests.
Fourth, the lack of clarity regarding whether or how
civil servants assess the policy relevance and quality of
evidence is reﬂected by an equivalent lack of clarity
regarding how governments handle the absence of evi-
dence. We have identiﬁed a clear omission in the TTCs’
submissions of evidence, which TTCs are known to
have,34–37 on the importance of packaging in the mar-
keting of their products.
Taken collectively, evidence present in and absent
from TTCs’ submissions highlights an important trans-
parency deﬁcit within Better Regulation processes. This
deﬁcit obscures the view of policymakers, potentially pre-
venting them from identifying and taking account of the
judicious selection and exclusion of evidence by corpor-
ate actors with vested interests in policy outcomes.
Because Better Regulation requires evidence-based
impact assessments and invites evidence-based
submissions to public consultations, the potential exists
for corporations to exert undue and unnoticed inﬂu-
ence on the policy process. Recently leaked industry
documents outlining Philip Morris International’s strat-
egy for ensuring standardised packaging is not adopted
in the UK indicate that the TTCs had identiﬁed and
planned to use the opportunities presented by Better
Regulation in making its arguments.50 51
Considering the statutory requirement imposed by
Article 5.3 of the FCTC to ‘protect’ tobacco control pol-
icies ‘from commercial and other vested interests of the
tobacco industry’,21 it would be advisable for the 177
states which are party to the Convention to implement
and publish clear guidelines on how TTC submissions to
public consultations, and evidence cited within, should
be managed by policymakers. Two steps could be taken
by governments to achieve this. First, conﬂict of interest
declarations regarding evidence cited could be made a
mandatory element of public consultations. Second, pol-
icymakers could adopt a similar methodology to that
used in this research. Adopting a process of classifying
evidence for subject matter, independence and peer-
review status may help policymakers to systematically pri-
oritise good quality and policy-focused evidence, and to
ﬂag evidence about which they need to be more scep-
tical, such as that which is not policy-focused, not inde-
pendent or not peer-reviewed.
These recommendations have relevance across govern-
ment departments in all states which are signatories to
the FCTC. It would also be appropriate to explore apply-
ing this critical perspective to the development of non-
tobacco public health regulation—for example, of the
alcohol and food industries—where corporate interests
also seek to inﬂuence policy being developed for the
public good.52 53
The strength of the ﬁndings is limited by the use of
indicators of quality, rather than a validated quality-
assessment framework, to assess the evidence.
Peer-review status and independence from the tobacco
industry are used as proxy indicators of quality. While we
acknowledge that peer-review standards can and do vary
in practice,54–57 our rationale for choosing these proxies
is based on our interest in addressing the challenges pol-
icymakers face in assessing large volumes of evidence.
Unlike quality assessment tools, the criteria we have
selected do not require scientiﬁc expertise or lengthy
data extraction processes and can be used systematically
Table 6 Distribution of transnational tobacco corporation evidence across typologies
Quality Quality indicators No quality indicators
Relevance Either independent, peer-reviewed
or both
Neither independent nor
peer-reviewed
Relevant Standardised packaging and other tobacco
packaging
12% (100% systematic review
evidence)
22%
Parallel Tobacco, not packaging and unrelated
to tobacco
65% 1%
Bold text refers to TTC evidence.
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in the policy environment to assess the relevance and
quality of evidence cited by consultation respondents.
Where the need is identiﬁed, more in-depth analysis of
study design, data and methods38–40 can be undertaken
to review key pieces of evidence.
What has been learned from the UK Government’s
2013 decision to postpone any decision on standardised
packaging until further evidence is available is that
Better Regulation ensures that evidence occupies a crit-
ical instrumental role in policymaking. Thus, how gov-
ernment departments handle and interpret evidence in
the development of public health policy, and what evi-
dential relevance and quality thresholds are set for
policy progression in the context of Better Regulation,
are of vital importance.
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